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ESSAY

Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital
Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims
BRENT E. NEWTON†
INTRODUCTION
Although caution always must be exercised in
interpreting Justices’ comments during oral arguments at
the Supreme Court of the United States—something likened
to reading tea leaves1—Justice Kennedy’s remarks during
the argument in Hall v. Florida2 in early 2014 nevertheless
are intriguing. Justice Kennedy’s positions on high-profile
legal issues like the death penalty, abortion rights, or civil
rights are a matter of great public concern because his vote

1. See Paul M. Secunda, The Many Mendelsohn “Me Too” Missteps: An
Alliterative Response to Professor Rubinstein, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 374, 378 n.28
(2008), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/19/
index.html (warning that attempting to interpret a Justice’s remarks during oral
argument is “an exercise tantamount to reading tea leaves”).
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2. 134 S. Ct. 471 (2013) (granting certiorari to review Hall v. State, 109 So.
3d 704 (Fla. 2012) (holding that Florida’s definition of “mental retardation” did
not violate the Eighth Amendment)). In Hall, the Court held that the definition
of “mental retardation” used at Hall’s trial was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. See Hall v. Florida, No. 12-10882, 2014 WL 2178332 (U.S. May 27,
2014).
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in a case is frequently the “swing vote” on the Court. 3 As I
discuss below, Justice Kennedy’s remarks at the Hall
argument suggest an interest in a “Lackey claim”4—an
argument under the Eighth Amendment that the state loses
its right to carry out a death sentence as a result of excessive
delay following the imposition of the sentence at trial.5 In
1995, the Court twice stayed Clarence Lackey’s execution
date based on his Eighth Amendment claim—and two
Justices, Stevens and Breyer, explicitly endorsed the claim—
although ultimately the full Court denied a third stay and
refused to review the issue in Lackey’s own case. He was
executed in 1997.6
I have a particular interest in Lackey claims, as I was
Lackey’s attorney who raised that claim in his two certiorari
petitions in 1995. While I no longer litigate capital cases, my
interest in Lackey claims has continued in the following two
decades.7 Although a majority of the Justices have not yet
addressed a Lackey claim in any case, Justice Kennedy’s
questions posed to Florida’s attorney during the Hall
argument in early 2014 indicate that he may be on the brink
of joining Justice Breyer and former Justice Stevens in their
oft-stated position that the Court should grant certiorari to
address whether excessive delays in death penalty cases
violate the Eighth Amendment under any circumstances.

4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995) (opinions of Stevens &
Breyer, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari); see also In re Lackey, 520 U.S.
1227, 1227 (1997) (denying third stay application and denying certiorari); Lackey
v. Scott, 514 U.S. 1093, 1093 (1995) (granting second stay application); Lackey v.
Texas 514 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1995) (granting first stay application).
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7. See Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death,
13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 41 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the Lackey claim
since 1995).
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3. See Charlotte Schneider, Supreme Court 2012-2013 Highlights, LII SUP.
CT. BULL., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/supreme_court_2012-2013_
term_highlights (last visited May 19, 2014) (“For some controversial . . . issues,
the Court often still splits along ideological lines, with Chief Justice Roberts along
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on the conservative side and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan having a more liberal view. Justice
Kennedy remains the central, or ‘swing,’ vote.”).
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I. LACKEY CLAIMS AND THE FOCUS ON THE PURPOSES OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In early 1995, when I was a capital defense attorney in
Texas, I took over the legal representation of Clarence
Lackey, who at the time was facing an imminent execution
date. Lackey originally had been sentenced to death in 1978.
In 1982, on his mandatory direct appeal, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed his capital murder conviction and
death sentence and ordered a new trial.8 On the mandatory
direct appeal following the second jury’s capital murder
conviction and death sentence, Lackey’s case remained before
the state high court for nine more years before the court
ultimately affirmed his conviction and sentence in 1991.9 He
unsuccessfully pursued discretionary post-conviction appeals
during the ensuing four years.10 In early 1995, I raised the
claim that executing Lackey at that point—after he had
spent nearly seventeen years (over 6,000 days) living under
a sentence of death, the vast majority of which were spent on
mandatory direct appeals—would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.11
Lackey’s Eighth Amendment claim had two independent
components, both of which contended that his execution after
seventeen years of delay would be “disproportionate” and,
thus, cruel and unusual punishment.12 First, it contended

10. Id.
11. See id. at 54-55.

C M
Y K

10/09/2014 13:23:35

12. It is well established, as a general constitutional principle, that
“disproportionate” punishments violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality op.) (citations omitted) (“The
history of the prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment [in the Eighth
Amendment] already has been reviewed at length. The phrase first appeared in
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by Parliament at the
accession of William and Mary. . . . The English version appears to have been
directed against punishments unauthorized by statute and beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as those disproportionate to the
offense involved.”); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420 (1972) (Powell,
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., & Blackmun & Powell, JJ.) (“It is . . . within
the historic process of constitutional adjudication to challenge the imposition of
the death penalty . . . as a penalty wholly disproportionate to a particular criminal
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9. Id.
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that the state’s carrying out the execution after keeping
Lackey under the physically and psychologically extreme
conditions of death row for such a lengthy period of time
would be cruel and unusual because it would exact more
punishment than the state was entitled to under the Eighth
Amendment.13 By 1995, several foreign courts had
recognized, as a basis for prohibiting capital punishment,
that lengthy stays on death row were cruel and inhumane.14
Particularly notable was the British Privy Council’s 1994
decision in Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, in
act.”); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting,
joined by Harlan & Whittaker, JJ.) (“Then, too, a cruelly disproportionate relation
between what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual
punishment, and, in respect to the States, even offend the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
13. See Newton, supra note 7, at 55-57.

10/09/2014 13:23:35
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14. See, e.g., Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, 2 A.C. 1, All E.R.
769 (P.C. 1993); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 26 (S. Afr.)
(opinion of Chaskalson, P.J., in which a majority of judges concurred); Catholic
Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-Gen., 1 Zimb. L. Rep. paras.
36, 49-51, 87-88 (Zimb. 1993); see also Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918, 919 n.3
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) (“Sadly, in refusing to hear
these [Lackey] claims, the Court turns a deaf ear to an argument that courts in
other countries have found persuasive.”) (citing foreign case law); cf. Soering v.
United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (European Court of Human Rights,
in interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights, noted the Convention
did not forbid capital punishment yet held that the Convention nevertheless
prohibited the United Kingdom from extraditing a capital defendant to Virginia
in large part because the six- to eight-year delay that typically accompanied a
death sentence there would be “cruel, inhuman, [or] degrading treatment or
punishment” forbidden by the Convention). Since Lackey v. Texas, the Supreme
Court of Canada, in allowing extradition to the United States of two Canadian
citizens charged with murder in Washington State, conditioned its ruling on the
guarantee that they would not receive the death penalty as punishment if
convicted. The Canadian high court reasoned that that the potential for lengthy
delays before execution was a “relevant consideration” in determining whether
extradition to the United States on capital charges would violate principles of
“fundamental justice,” as guaranteed by the Canadian Constitution. See United
States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.). Also notable is the fact that, “[i]n
2009, the President of Kenya commuted the death sentences of all of the over
4,000 death row inmates [there] to life [imprisonment], citing the wait to face
execution as ‘undue mental anguish and suffering.’” Death Penalty Information
Center,
Time
on
Death
Row:
International
Perspective,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row.
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which the highest court in Britain observed that lengthy
delays in carrying out death sentences would never have
been tolerated at any point in the past in England when
capital punishment was practiced.15 The Eighth Amendment
was based on the 1689 English Bill of Rights’ proscription
against “cruel and unusual punishment.”16 Justice Kennedy,
15. See Pratt & Morgan, 2 A.C. at 4 (“It is difficult to envisage any
circumstances in which in England a condemned man would have been kept in
prison for years awaiting execution. But if such a situation had been brought to
the attention of the court their Lordships do not doubt that the judges would have
stayed the execution to enable the prerogative of mercy to be exercised and the
sentence commuted to one of life imprisonment.”); see also id. at 3 (noting “the
pre-existing common law practice that execution followed as swiftly as practical
after sentence”); id. at 7 (“Before independence [from England] the law would
have protected a Jamaican citizen from being executed after an unconscionable
delay”); Riley v. Atty. Gen. for Jamaica, 1 A.C. 719, 734-35 (Privy Council 1983)
(Lord Scarman, dissenting, joined by Lord Brightman, on grounds not addressed
by majority) (arguing that “execution after inordinate delay would have infringed
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to be found in Section 10
of the Bill of Rights of 1689,” and concluding that “the jurisprudence of the
civilized world, much of which is derived from common law principles and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights,
has recognized and acknowledged that prolonged delay in executing a sentence of
death can make the punishment when it comes inhuman and degrading”).
Notably, in 1972, the four dissenting Justices in Furman stated that:

408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell &
Rehnquist, JJ.). The Furman dissenters appear to have been unaware of AngloAmerican practices concerning delays in carrying out execution in the late 1700s.
Furthermore, the average delays in carrying out executions have grown
exponentially since Furman. See, e.g., James A. McCafferty, The Death Sentence,
1960, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 95-96 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964) (in
1960, the median delay between capital sentencing at trial and execution in
America was sixteen months); see also infra note 37 and accompanying text
(noting that average delays have grown to between fifteen and twenty years).
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16. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The phrase in our Constitution
was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights of 168[9].”); see also
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (“There is now little room for doubt

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 103 Side A

[A]lthough a man awaiting execution must inevitably experience
extraordinary mental anguish, no one suggests that this anguish is
materially different from that experienced by condemned men in 1791,
even though protracted appellate review processes have greatly
increased the waiting time on “death row.” To be sure, the ordeal of the
condemned man may be thought cruel in the sense that all suffering is
thought cruel. But if the Constitution proscribed every punishment
producing severe emotional stress, then capital punishment would
clearly have been impermissible in 1791.
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in an opinion for the Court discussing the Eighth
Amendment in a context other than Lackey (that of the
execution of juvenile capital defendants), observed: “The
United Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here
in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light
of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins. The Amendment
was modeled on a parallel provision in the English
Declaration of Rights of 1689 . . . .”17
Lackey’s petitions to the Supreme Court in 1995 had a
second argument that did not focus on the inhumanity of
keeping a condemned man under a death sentence for
seventeen years. The second component of his claim
contended that neither of the state’s primary justifications
for capital punishment—retribution and deterrence—would
be meaningfully served in Lackey’s case after such a lengthy
delay, particularly a delay primarily attributable to the state
(as opposed to Lackey).18 This argument found strong support
in the writings of the Framers of the Constitution and
influential contemporary legal theorists such as Blackstone
and Beccaria.19 Significantly, it also was buttressed by
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,20

17. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
18. See Newton, supra note 7, at 58. Although the Court has mentioned both
retribution and deterrence as purposes of capital punishment, the Court has
stated that retribution is the “primary justification for the death penalty.”
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984).
19. See Newton, supra note 7, at 55-58, nn.65-68 & 70.
20. 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring). Justice White wrote:

10/09/2014 13:23:35

The [death] penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual
punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified
by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it ceases
realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging question
is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 103 Side B

that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces,
at a minimum, those modes of punishment that had been considered cruel and
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted [in 1791].”); Ex Parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (“The language of the Constitution cannot
be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted.”);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904) (“In ascertaining the meaning
of a phrase from the Bill of Rights it must be construed with reference to the
[English] common law from which it was taken.”).
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Y K

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 104 Side A

2014]

10/09/2014 13:23:35

THE FUTURE OF LACKEY CLAIMS

985

an unusual 1981 opinion from then-Justice Rehnquist
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Coleman v.
Balkcom,21 and commentary from retired Justice Powell.22 All
three—White, Rehnquist, and Powell—were Justices (along
Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be
the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with
such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
Id.; see also id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (retribution is undermined “[w]hen
people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve’ . . . .”).
21. 451 U.S. 949, 959-60 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Justice Rehnquist wrote:
When society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct, and
then the courts fail to do so, the courts not only lessen the deterrent effect
of the threat of capital punishment, they undermine the integrity of the
entire criminal justice system. . . . There [also] can be little doubt that
delay in the enforcement of capital punishment frustrates the purpose of
retribution.
Id. Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion did not contend that there was any
“cert-worthy” issue in Coleman’s case. Rather, Justice Rehnquist complained that
denying certiorari and allowing Coleman’s case to proceed to federal habeas
corpus review would only improperly postpone his execution beyond the delays
already occasioned by his direct and collateral appeals in the state court system:

See id. at 956.

C M
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22. Justice (Retired) Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1989) (“[Y]ears of delay between sentencing and
execution . . . undermine[] the deterrent effect of capital punishment and reduce[]
public confidence in [our] criminal justice system.”). Like Justice Rehnquist in his
Coleman dissent, former Justice Powell was not endorsing an Eighth Amendment
Lackey-type claim. Nevertheless, like Justice Rehnquist, he recognized that
excessive delay undermined the penological purposes of capital punishment—a
point fully supporting the second constitutional basis of a Lackey claim.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 104 Side A

Ordinarily I would have no hesitation joining the majority of my
colleagues in denying the petition for certiorari in this case. The
questions presented in the petition are of importance only to petitioner
himself and therefore are not suitable candidates for the exercise of our
discretionary jurisdiction. But in a larger sense, the case raises
significant issues about the administration of capital punishment
statutes in this country, and reflects the increasing tendency to postpone
or delay the enforcement of those constitutionally valid statutes. Because
I think stronger measures are called for than the mere denial of certiorari
in a case such as this, I would grant the petition for certiorari so that the
case can be fully briefed and argued.
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with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Stevens) who voted to uphold the post-Furman death
penalty system in Gregg v. Georgia23 in 1976, a time when
delays in the administration of the death penalty obviously
did not exist.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately refused to grant
certiorari and stay Clarence Lackey’s execution, Justices
Stevens and Breyer suggested that the claim was worthy of
close judicial scrutiny and may have merit.24 Justice Stevens
contended that the case was cert-worthy but stated that its
“novelty” was a valid basis for denying certiorari at that
juncture.25 He nevertheless suggested that the state’s
interests in retribution and deterrence did not “retain any
force” for a condemned inmate who had already spent
seventeen years under a death sentence.26 He also noted that
such a delay would have been considered cruel and unusual
punishment according to Anglo-American jurisprudence
antedating the Eighth Amendment’s adoption in 1791.27
Justice Breyer noted his agreement with Justice Stevens’s
assessment of Lackey’s claim being an “important undecided”
issue.28
Following the two Justices’ encouragement for the claim
to be raised in other cases, many death row inmates around
the country raised what soon came to be known as a “Lackey

24. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (opinions of Stevens &
Breyer, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari).
25. See id.
26. See id.

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 104 Side B

23. 428 U.S. 153, 157 (1976).

27. See id.
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28. Id. at 1047; see also Lackey v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 911 (1996) (denying
certiorari, but noting that Breyer, J., voted to grant certiorari in Lackey’s
subsequent appeal).
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claim”29 based on inordinate delays in their cases.30 Although
no lower court has granted relief on a Lackey claim, and the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in several cases raising
Lackey claims between 1995 and 2014, some of these cases
have occasioned a recurring dialogue between Justice Breyer
(at times joined by former Justice Stevens) and Justice
Thomas in dueling opinions issued in connection with the
denials of certiorari or stays of execution.31 In cases where
29. See Lagrand v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[c]laims that
the Eighth Amendment would be violated by the execution of an inmate after
many years [on death row] are called Lackey claims, after Lackey v. Texas”);
Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n.229 (Utah 2010) (“[W]e . . . refer to the
claims as ‘Lackey claims,’ given its now common usage. . . .”).
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31. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari and denial of stay of execution); Valle v.
Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1-2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay);
Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542-46 (2009) (statement of Stevens &
Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299-1304 (2009)
(statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985-86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1136 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and stay of execution); Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990, 990-93 (2002) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari; opinion of Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of
Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990,
990-99 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari; opinion of
Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari; opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 105 Side A

30. See, e.g., Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 568-70 (8th Cir. 1998);
Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 926, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1995); Fearance v. Scott, 56
F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1995); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995);
McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d
1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir.
1995); Ex Parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138, 139-40 (Ala. 1997); State v. Schackart, 947
P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 44-45 (Cal. 1998);
Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1096 (Fla. 2000); People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d
1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000); Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697-98 (Ind. 2005); State
v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1287-88 (Mont. 1996); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86,
93-94 (Neb. 1999); State v. Davis, No. 2011-0538, 2014 WL 1622936, ¶ 70 (Ohio
Apr. 22, 2014). Several concurring or dissenting lower court judges have indicated
that, in their opinion, Lackey claims may have merit at least in some cases. See,
e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369-78 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1484-89 (Norris, J., dissenting); cf. Simms, 736
N.E.2d at 1143-45 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); Smith, 931 P.2d at 1291-92
(Leaphart, J., specially concurring).
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condemned men have been on death row for cumulative
periods of years ranging from nineteen to thirty-three years
as a result of repeated resentencings following appellate
reversals, Justice Breyer has argued that such inmates had
made out strong cases under the Eighth Amendment for
being removed from death row.32 Justice Thomas has
responded that the Lackey claims in such cases categorically
lack merit because there is no basis in “American
constitutional tradition” for the “proposition that a [capital]
defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and
collateral procedures [permitted in the modern era] and then
complain when his execution is delayed.”33
In addition to the many cases during the past two
decades addressing Lackey claims, a large number of legal
scholars have written about the Lackey issue.34 The vast
from denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944-46 (1998) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
32. See, e.g., Muhammad, 134 S. Ct. at 834 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari and stay of execution); Knight, 528 U.S. at 996-99 (opinion of Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944-46 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
33. Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

10/09/2014 13:23:35
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34. See, e.g., Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence
and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 147, 168-70 (1998); Corey D. Burton & John D. Burrow, How Long Must
They Wait? Lackey Claims, Excessive Delay, and Evolving Standards of Decency,
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014); Russell Christopher, Death Delayed Is
Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Jessica Feldman, A
Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment
Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 187-89 (1999); Kathleen
M. Flynn, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted Death Row Confinement
Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 291, 291-94 (1997); Ryan S. Hedges, Justices Blind: How the
Rehnquist Court’s Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution
Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001);
Michael Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple
Punishments, and Extended Stays on Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85 (2013);
Karl S. Myers, Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding an Execution After a Long
Stay on Death Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v. Texas, 106 DICK. L. Rev.
647, 650 (2002); Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death Row
Should Be Deemed Too Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089 (2012); Jeremy
Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim, 27
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 284 (2001-02); Kara Sharkey, Comment, Delay
in Considering the Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row

35467-buf_62-4 Sheet No. 106 Side A

2014]

10/09/2014 13:23:35

THE FUTURE OF LACKEY CLAIMS

989

majority of them have contended that the Lackey claim has
merit, at least in some cases.35
During the two decades since Lackey v. Texas, the
average delay between the imposition and execution of death
sentences has steadily grown.36 In 1995, the delay averaged
around ten years. Currently, that average delay had grown
to at least fifteen (and actually closer to twenty) years.37 As a
recent commentator noted, in the four decades since the
death penalty was reinstituted following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Furman, “in four of the top five states with
the largest death row populations, more death row prisoners
[have] died of old age than were executed.”38 Thus, the basis
for the Lackey claim—particularly as a “systemic” Lackey
claim, that is, one challenging the entire system of American
capital punishment (or at least a single state’s system of
capital punishment) based on systemic delays39—has only
Phenomenon and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 865 (2013); Erin
Simmons, Comment, Challenging an Execution After Prolonged Confinement on
Death Row [Lackey Revisited], 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1249, 1250-51 (2009);
Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Why
Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1585 (2013).
35. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 34; Sun, supra note 34.

37. Id. As I explained in that article, the average delay is closer to twenty years
when the cumulative time that executed inmates spent under death sentences is
considered (as opposed to only delays since their most recent death sentences).
Many capital defendants received second death sentences at retrials following
appellate reversals. See id. at 43-44.
38. See Christopher, supra note 34, at 2 (citing TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Capital Punishment, 2011, tbls. 15, 17
(2013), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp11st.pdf). That same
commentator noted the inevitability of “tenures of forty or even fifty years on
death row” in the future (based on trends during the past two decades).
Christopher, supra note 34, at 43.
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39. Cf. Sara Colón, Capital Crime: How California’s Administration of the
Death Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1384-85
(2009) (contending that “California’s capital punishment system is
unconstitutional both because its delays and low execution rate mean that it in
many ways is not retributive or deterrent at all, and because it is never more
retributive or deterrent than life without parole.”).
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Sentencing and Execution (Months)”).
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grown more compelling since the Court refused to review
Lackey’s case in 1995.40
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S REMARKS DURING THE HALL
ARGUMENT
In Hall v. Florida, in 2013, the Court granted certiorari
to address Florida’s definition of “mental retardation” used to
decide whether mentally disabled capital defendants like
Hall are constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty
under Atkins v. Virginia.41 During the argument,42 Justice
Breyer initially noted that Hall had been on Florida’s death
row for thirty-five years, a point which did not relate to the
legal issue on which the Court had granted certiorari.43
Justice Breyer’s comment was not surprising to those
interested in the evolution of the Lackey jurisprudence
during the past two decades, given his repeated assertions
that the Court should grant certiorari and address the Lackey
40. As I have written elsewhere:

Newton, supra note 7, at 64-65; see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 682 (2010) (“The real power of the Lackey claim is not in its
potential to yield fruit as a cognizable claim of individual deprivation. Rather, the
issue sheds light on the dysfunctional character of our capital system.”).
41. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded
criminals is cruel and unusual punishment).
42. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Hall v. Florida, 2014 WL 2178332 (U.S.
Mar. 3, 2014), (No. 12-10882), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-10882_7758.pdf [hereinafter Transcript].
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43. Id. at 45-46. Immediately after Justice Breyer’s question, Justice Scalia
asked, “How has it gone on this long? 1978 is when he killed this woman,” to
which Florida Solicitor General Alan Winsor responded, “There have been a
number of appeals in this case. There have been a number of issues raised [over
the years]. . . .” Id.
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The original Lackey claim was based on an inmate-specific case of
excessive delay and, in particular, on delay more attributable to the state
than to the death-row inmate. Yet the claim’s jurisprudential basis
arguably transcends individual cases of delay and extends to all inmates
on death row when systemic delays reach a certain point. Just as
Furman had the effect of invalidating every existing death sentence in
America, the ineluctable logic of the Lackey claim—if ever embraced by
a majority of the Court—would provide a forceful argument that every
death sentence in America is invalid because systemic delays have
undermined the legitimate purposes of capital punishment.
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44. Justice Scalia’s comments indicate his apparent agreement with Justice
Thomas’s position regarding Lackey claims:

Cf. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991-92 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
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It is worth noting, in addition, that, in most cases raising this novel
claim, the delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this
Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence, . . . It is incongruous to
arm capital defendants with an arsenal of “constitutional” claims with
which they may delay their executions, and simultaneously to complain
when executions are inevitably delayed.
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issue. What occurred next at the Hall argument—Justice
Kennedy’s follow-up comments and questions—was
surprising to such observers:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [T]he last ten people Florida has
executed have spent an average of 24.9 years on death row.
Do you think that that is consistent with the purposes of the
death penalty, and . . . is it consistent with sound
administration of the justice system?
MR. WINSOR [counsel for the State of Florida]: Well, I
certainly think it’s consistent with the Constitution, and I
think that there are obvious . . .
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That wasn’t my question.
MR. WINSOR: Oh, I’m sorry, I apologize.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it consistent with . . . the
purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve, and is
it consistent with an orderly administration of justice?
MR. WINSOR: It’s consistent with the . . .
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Go ahead.
MR. WINSOR: It is consistent with the purposes of the
death penalty certainly.
JUSTICE SCALIA: General Winsor, maybe you should
ask us . . . that question, inasmuch . . . as most of the delay
has been because of rules that we have imposed.44
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, let me . . . ask this. Of course
most of the delay is at the hands of the defendant. In this case
it was 5 years before there was a hearing on the on
the . . . Atkins question. Has the Attorney General of Florida
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suggested to the legislature any . . . measures, any provisions,
any statutes, to expedite the consideration of these cases.
MR. WINSOR: Your Honor, there was a statute enacted
last session, last spring, that is -- it’s called the Timely
Justice Act, that addresses a number of issues that you raise,
and it’s presently being challenged in front of the Florida
Supreme Court. . . .45
***
Justice Kennedy’s comments are notable for two main
reasons. First, they did not appear to be off the cuff. In the
oral argument of a case in which certiorari had been granted
on a legal issue that had nothing to do with Lackey,46 Justice
Kennedy clearly had prepared for his Lackey-related
questions because he cited an arcane statistic about the
average delay before executions in the past ten Florida
cases.47 Second, his repeated question about “the purposes
that the death penalty is designed to serve” certainly appears
to allude to the primary arguments made by Justices Stevens
and Breyer in addressing Lackey claims since 1995.48 Part III
addresses Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment opinions
regarding the purposes of punishment in other contexts.

46. Neither Justice Kennedy nor any other Justice made reference to the
Lackey issue in the majority or dissenting opinions later issued in Hall. See Hall
v. Florida, No. 12-10882, 2014 WL 2178332 (U.S. May 27, 2014). The fact that the
issue was not addressed in the written opinions is not surprising, considering the
Court's well-established practice of not ordinarily addressing issues not raised in
certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992). The Lackey
issue in Hall was not raised in the certiorari petition. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Hall v. Crews et al., 2013 WL 5702378 (U.S. June 6, 2013) (No. 1210882).
47. It is not apparent what the source of that data was. It was not mentioned
in any of the petitions or briefs submitted in Hall v. Florida.
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48. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 543 (2009) (“[D]elaying an
execution does not further public purposes of retribution and deterrence but only
diminishes whatever possible benefit society might receive from petitioner’s
death. . . . In other words, the penological justifications for the death penalty
diminish as the delay lengthens.”) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari,
joined by Breyer, J.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
As discussed below, Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment consistently has been with a keen
eye toward whether a legislatively authorized sentence
meaningfully serves the legitimate purposes of punishment.
His judicial opinions, though, have not been written on a
blank slate. In 1976, the controlling plurality of the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia,49 which upheld the modern death penalty
nearly four decades ago (when it was in its infancy),
recognized that retribution and deterrence are the two
primary purposes of capital punishment,50 and further stated
that “the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without
penological justification” or it will violate the Eighth
Amendment.51 Although the Court in Gregg upheld the postFurman death penalty as a general matter, in future cases
the Court invalidated particular applications of capital
49. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality op.). Although it was a plurality opinion, it
was the “controlling” opinion of the Court because it represented the Court’s
judgment on the “narrowest grounds.” See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 360
(1993); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15.
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51. Gregg, 428 U.S at 182-83 (citation omitted); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592-93 n.4 (1976) (plurality op.) (capital punishment would be
unconstitutional if it did not “measurably serve the legitimate ends of
punishment”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301-02 (1987) (same; quoting
Gregg).
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50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (“The death penalty is said to serve two principal
social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders.”). In a footnote, the plurality in Gregg also briefly mentioned a third
purpose arguably served by capital punishment—incapacitation. Id. at 183 n.28
(“Another purpose that has been discussed is the incapacitation of dangerous
criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise
commit in the future.”). Incapacitation—which the Court has never discussed in
any other case in which the death penalty has been invalidated under the Eighth
Amendment as not serving the purposes of punishment, see, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2004) (only discussing retribution and deterrence)—
would not be meaningfully served by executing an inmate after a long period of
delay because the inmate (likely in his middle-age or geriatric years by that time)
would still remain incarcerated. See Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1,2 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissent from denial of a stay of execution) (“It seems yet more unlikely that the
execution, coming after what is close to a lifetime of imprisonment, matters in
respect to incapacitation.”).
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punishment as not measurably advancing deterrence or
retribution.52
In Enmund v. Florida,53 the first post-Gregg case
invalidating the death penalty on the grounds that it did not
serve the purposes of capital punishment, the Court
addressed whether capital punishment could be applied to a
non-triggerman accomplice who did not act with intent or
deliberate indifference towards a coconspirator’s killing of
the victim:
Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund’s
position measurably contributes to [retribution or deterrence], it is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment. We are
quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty
will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not
kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be
taken. . . . Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he
did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does
not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that
the criminal gets his just deserts.54

Two decades later, in Atkins v. Virginia,55 the Court (with
Justice Kennedy joining Justice Stevens’s majority opinion),
held that the purposes of capital punishment also would not
be served by executing mentally retarded capital defendants:

52. Although the state’s interests in both deterrence and retribution have been
considered in such analyses, the central focus arguably should be on retribution,
as the Court has recognized that “the primary justification for the death penalty
is retribution.” Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1982).

54. Id. at 798-99, 801 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
55. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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53. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Justice Kennedy was not a member of the Court at the
time it decided Enmund. Id. at 783.
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With respect to retribution—the interest in seeing that the offender
gets his “just deserts”—the severity of the appropriate punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender. Since Gregg,
our jurisprudence has consistently confined the imposition of the
death penalty to a narrow category of the most serious crimes. . . . If
the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the
most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability
of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution. Thus, pursuant to our narrowing jurisprudence, which
seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to
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death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate. With
respect to deterrence—the interest in preventing capital crimes by
prospective offenders—it seems likely that capital punishment can
serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation. . . . The theory of deterrence in
capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased
severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from
carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive and
behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally
culpable—for example, the diminished ability to understand and
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded from
execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with
respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Such
individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will continue to
face the threat of execution. Thus, executing the mentally retarded
will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.56

In Roper v. Simmons,57 Justice Kennedy authored the
Court’s majority opinion, which held that “neither retribution
nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing
the death penalty on juvenile [capital] offenders” and, thus,
the penalty was deemed “disproportionate” under the Eighth
Amendment in all such cases.58 His opinion reasoned that:

57. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
58. Id. at 572, 575.
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56. Id. at 319-20 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is
evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty
apply to them with lesser force than to adults. We have held there
are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty:
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders. . . . Whether viewed as an attempt to express the
community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance
for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the
law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason
of youth and immaturity. As for deterrence, it is unclear whether
the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent
effect on juveniles, as counsel for petitioner acknowledged at oral
argument. . . . Here, however, the absence of evidence of deterrent
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that
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render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that
juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. . . . To the extent the
juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is
worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a
young person.59

In Kennedy v. Louisiana,60 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court concluded that capital punishment for rape of a
child (not resulting in death) likewise did not meaningfully
serve the two purposes of capital punishment:
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The goal of retribution, which reflects society’s and the victim’s
interests in seeing that the offender is repaid for the hurt he caused,
does not justify the harshness of the death penalty here. In
measuring retribution, as well as other objectives of criminal law,
it is appropriate to distinguish between a particularly depraved
murder that merits death as a form of retribution and the crime of
child rape. There is an additional reason for our conclusion that
imposing the death penalty for child rape would not further
retributive purposes. In considering whether retribution is served,
among other factors we have looked to whether capital punishment
has the potential . . . to allow the community as a whole, including
the surviving family and friends of the victim, to affirm its own
judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the
ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed. In considering the
death penalty for nonhomicide offenses this inquiry necessarily also
must include the question whether the death penalty balances the
wrong to the victim. It is not at all evident that the child rape
victim’s hurt is lessened when the law permits the death of the
perpetrator. . . . With respect to deterrence, if the death penalty
adds to the risk of nonreporting, that, too, diminishes the penalty’s
objectives. Underreporting is a common problem with respect to
child sexual abuse. . . . In addition, by in effect making the
punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State that
punishes child rape by death may remove a strong incentive for the
rapist not to kill the victim. Assuming the offender behaves in a
rational way, as one must to justify the penalty on grounds of
deterrence, the penalty in some respects gives less protection, not
more, to the victim, who is often the sole witness to the
crime. . . . Each of these propositions, standing alone, might not
establish the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for the crime
of child rape. Taken in sum, however, they demonstrate the serious
negative consequences of making child rape a capital offense. These
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59. Id. at 571-72 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
60. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
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considerations lead us to conclude, in our independent judgment,
that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the
rape of a child.61

Justice Kennedy’s interest in assessing whether the
purposes of punishment measurably contribute to a
particular penalty has extended beyond capital cases. In his
seminal concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,62 in
which a majority of Justices upheld a mandatory sentence of
life without parole for a first-time defendant convicted of
possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Justice Kennedy
stated that “the Michigan Legislature could with reason
conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society
by possession of this large an amount of cocaine—in terms of
violence, crime, and social displacement—is momentous
enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life
61. Id. at 442-46 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Panetti
v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court held
that a death row inmate who had become mentally incompetent by the time of the
scheduled execution date could not be executed consistently with the Eighth
Amendment until competency was restored. His opinion reasoned, in part, that
execution of an incompetent offender would not meaningfully advance the state’s
interest in retribution:

Id. at 934-35, 958-59. The state’s interest in deterrence was not at issue in Panetti
because his mental incompetency developed long after the capital murder.
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62. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by
O’Connor & Souter, JJ.). Subsequently, in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003)—another case challenging a lengthy prison sentence as violative of the
Eighth Amendment—Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin was
deemed to be the controlling opinion of the Court. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J.); see
also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (citing Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Harmelin as setting forth “the governing legal principle”).
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Considering . . . whether retribution is served[,] it might be said that
capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the
offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the
community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the
victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is
so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed. The
potential for a prisoner’s recognition of the severity of the offense and the
objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if the
prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his
awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole.
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sentence without parole.”63 By contrast, in Graham v.
Florida,64 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court held that a
life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender who
committed a nonhomicide offense did not satisfy the purposes
of such a sentence. As his opinion stated:
A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense [under the Eighth
Amendment]. With respect to life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that
have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provides an adequate
justification.65

His opinion for the Court in Graham thus invalidated a
sentence of life without parole for all juveniles convicted of a
nonhomicide offense, no matter how serious in nature.66
CONCLUSION

63. Hamerlin, 501 U.S. at 1003.
64. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
65. Id. at 2028 (internal citation omitted).
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66. Id. at 2034. Subsequently, in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the
Court—in a majority opinion written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justice
Kennedy—similarly struck down mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile murder defendants and reasoned in part that such mandatory sentences
were without adequate penological justification. See id. at 2465-66.
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Several of the Court’s prior decisions—including Roper,
Kennedy, and Graham during the past decade, in which the
majority opinions were authored by Justice Kennedy—have
held that certain criminal sentences, both capital and noncapital, violate the Eighth Amendment because the
legitimate purposes of punishment would not be measurably
served by such penalties. Justice Kennedy’s questions posed
to counsel for the State of Florida during the Hall argument
about whether the purposes of capital punishment would be
served by executing capital defendants after decades of delay
thus appear significant.
A central premise of a Lackey claim is that excessive
delays in carrying out executions undermine the penological
justifications for the death penalty and, therefore, the state
forfeits its right to implement the death penalty in such cases
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because life imprisonment would serve those justifications
sufficiently. When the Court decided Gregg in 1976,
inordinate delays obviously did not exist in the
administration of capital punishment in the United States.
Nearly four decades later, it has become an issue of such
significance that the Justice holding the “swing vote” on the
current Supreme Court felt compelled to raise the issue
during an oral argument in a case in which certiorari had
been granted on an entirely unrelated issue. Justice
Kennedy’s concern may be limited to individual cases with
inordinate delays (like the thirty-five years in Hall’s case),
although his citation of data about the average delay before
the last ten executions in Florida suggest he may have larger,
systemic concerns. Only time will tell whether Justice
Kennedy’s apparent interest in the issue will result in the
Court’s decision to grant certiorari and finally address it
nearly two decades after certiorari was denied in Lackey.
POST-SCRIPT

68. See id.; see also supra Part I.
69. See supra Part I.

C M
Y K

10/09/2014 13:23:35

67. See Jones v. Chappell, No. CV 09-02158-CJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97254
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014).
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Shortly before this Essay was published, a federal
district court in California declared that the state’s death
penalty is categorically unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment because of “systemic delay” in the
implementation of the penalty.67 In Jones v. Chappell, the
court specifically reasoned that the two primary purposes of
capital punishment—deterrence and retribution—are not
served when such “systemic delay” exists and, for that
reason, the state’s death penalty is unconstitutional.68 Jones
is likely to serve as a catalyst for a renewed round of Lackey
claims, in particular “systemic Lackey claims.”69 It may well
be the vehicle for the Supreme Court to finally address the
Lackey issue.

